Abstract We provide a new explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend tax capitalization. Our analysis is twofold. First, we conduct a theoretical analysis that shows that liquidity (illiquidity) mitigates (magnifies) the positive effect of dividend taxes on expected rates of return documented in prior literature. Second, we conduct an empirical analysis centered around the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003, which reduced the difference between the maximum statutory dividend and capital gains tax rates, and find results consistent with our theory. We also provide results suggesting that institutional ownership's mitigating effect on dividend tax capitalization documented in prior studies is attributable to stocks with greater institutional ownership being more liquid and not to the ''marginal investor'' being insensitive to dividend taxes.
Introduction
For decades researchers in economics, finance, and accounting have debated and sought evidence that dividend taxes are impounded into the value of equity shares (e.g., Black and Scholes 1974; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 1979 , 1980 Scholes 1978, 1982; Ayers et al. 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2003 Dhaliwal et al. , 2005 . To identify the effect, several empirical papers predict and find that the positive relation between expected pretax rates of return and dividend taxes is greater the lower the institutional ownership in a firm (e.g., Ayers et al. 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2003 Dhaliwal et al. , 2005 Dhaliwal et al. , 2007 Dai et al. 2013; Campbell et al. 2013) . These studies presume that institutional investors are tax-insensitive, either because they are exempt from taxes (e.g., pensions) or because they are corporations and thus receive the dividends-received deduction. Moreover, they presume that the remainder of a firm's shareholders are tax-sensitive individual investors.
In economic models of asset pricing, the role of prices is to arbitrage, or average over, investors' investment attributes (e.g., information about assets' future performance, attitudes toward risk, sensitivities to tax, etc.) to determine a market-clearing price, that is, a price such that investors' demand for an asset equals the available supply of the asset. Prior empirical studies that use institutional ownership as a tool to identify dividend tax capitalization rely on a ''marginal investor'' argument (Miller and Scholes 1982) . However, in a large economy characterized by many investors, no particular investor's investment attributes can affect price because an individual investor's demand is too small in relation to the economy as a whole. Moreover, prior theoretical studies show that it is the weighted average tax rate of all investors in the economy, where the weight depends on investors' risk tolerances, that determines the extent to which dividend taxes are capitalized (e.g., Brennan 1970; Gordon and Bradford 1980; Michaely and Vila 1995; Bond et al. 2007; Sansing 2006, 2010) .
1 Because institutional ownership is highly correlated with liquidity (i.e., Spearman correlation between the percentage of a firm's outstanding shares owned by institutional investors and Amihud's (2002) measure of illiquidity is À0.49), we expect that the mitigating effect of institutional ownership on dividend tax capitalization documented in prior empirical studies is actually attributable to stocks with greater institutional ownership being more liquid. Unlike the marginal investor explanation, our liquidity explanation has a theoretical foundation, which we describe below.
Our analysis is twofold. We begin with a theoretical analysis that shows that liquidity mitigates and illiquidity magnifies the effect of dividend taxes on expected pretax rates of return, hereinafter referred to as ''expected returns'' or ''cost of capital.'' Next we conduct an empirical analysis that corroborates the prediction from our theoretical model. The intuition for why liquidity mitigates and illiquidity magnifies the effect of dividend taxes on expected returns is very simple. As the market for a firm's shares becomes less liquid, share price becomes more sensitive to changes in features of the economy. Share price is more sensitive in a less liquid market because less liquidity implies that there is less cushion to absorb shocks to, or changes in, the economy. Features of an economy whose change might result in price shocks include investor-level tax rates, investors' aversion to risk, the quality of information about the firm, etc. As these features change, and as the market becomes less liquid, heightened price sensitivity implies that the absolute value of the percentage change in price increases. For example, as the market for a firm's shares becomes increasingly less liquid, a reduction in the dividend tax rate leads to an increasingly larger percentage increase in price.
Prior dividend tax capitalization studies (e.g., Brennan 1970; Guenther and Sansing 2010) express the dividend tax penalty as the product of a firm's dividend yield and the excess of the dividend tax rate over the capital gains tax rate. Holding constant a firm's per-share dividend payout, its dividend yield (which equals its pershare dividend payout divided by its price per share) declines more the less liquid the firm's stock is when the dividend tax rate declines because its price increases more the less liquid it is. Thus because the absolute value of the percentage change in price is associated negatively with liquidity, lower liquidity will magnify the effect of a tax rate change on a firm's dividend tax penalty and thus on its expected return, whereas higher liquidity will mitigate the effect. This implies that, when one assesses the behavior of a firm's expected return, the effect of the dividend tax rate cannot be divorced from the level of liquidity in the market for the firm's shares.
Our prediction that greater liquidity moderates and lower liquidity magnifies the positive relation between dividend taxes and expected returns is based on the assumption that markets are imperfectly competitive to some degree (e.g., Lambert et al. 2012) . If markets are perfectly competitive, which implies that markets are infinitely liquid, our prediction will not hold. Although our explanation is very intuitive, we believe that prior studies have overlooked liquidity as an explanation for the mitigating role of institutional ownership because prior theoretical studies on dividend tax capitalization are based on the after-tax Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Brennan (1970) and Gordon and Bradford (1980) . The CAPM is a model of perfect competition, where liquidity plays no role.
We empirically test the effect of liquidity on dividend tax capitalization surrounding the enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03), which reduced the maximum statutory tax rate on dividend income from 38.1 to 15 % and the maximum statutory tax rate on capital gains from 20 to 15 %, thereby reducing the difference between the two rates. We use this setting for two reasons. First, several prior studies examine the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2007; Dai et al. 2013 ) and find that expected returns decline after the act and that the decrease is smaller for stocks with greater institutional ownership. Second, we use a narrow window around the enactment of JGTRRA03 (2002) (2003) (2004) to isolate the effect of liquidity on dividend tax capitalization over a period in which liquidity does not vary significantly.
Our proxy for expected returns is an estimate of implied cost of capital that is derived from a model that simultaneously estimates a firm's implied cost of capital and growth in residual earnings (Easton et al. 2002) . We use this measure because we expect that this period is characterized by differences in growth in residual earnings among firms, and we want to control for this growth. We use Amihud's (2002) measure of price impact as our measure of illiquidity. Amihud's ratio gives the absolute percentage price change per dollar of daily trading volume or the daily price impact of the order flow. In this sense, the measure is consistent with Kyle's (1985) concept of illiquidity ðkÞ or the response of price to order flow. Consistent with the results in prior studies (e.g., Auerbach and Hassett 2005; Dhaliwal et al. 2007) , we find that expected returns decrease significantly following JGTRRA03.
Moreover, consistent with our prediction, we find that the decrease is significantly greater for less liquid stocks.
Next, we replicate the result in prior studies that institutional ownership mitigates the decrease in expected returns following JGTRRA03; however, we can only replicate this result using the implied cost of capital measures used in these prior studies (i.e., it is not robust to using the Easton et al. (2002) implied cost of capital measure).
2 Moreover, once we control for how the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns varied with firms' liquidity, we no longer find that institutional ownership plays a mitigating role. From this result, we conclude that the finding in prior studies that greater institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization is not due to the marginal investor being insensitive to dividend taxes but rather to the greater liquidity of these stocks.
Other variables that similarly affect price (e.g., risk) could also magnify the effects of dividend tax capitalization. To the extent these other variables are negatively correlated with institutional ownership, they too could explain prior studies' finding that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization. We empirically address this issue in Sect. 4.1. Moreover, Guenther and Sansing (2010) conclude that the mitigating effect of institutional ownership is attributable to stocks with greater institutional ownership having lower risk tolerance among taxable investors. Our explanation and the one in Guenther and Sansing (2010) are not mutually exclusive. Both are supported by theory, unlike the marginal investor argument.
This paper has important implications for academic researchers and policymakers. First, researchers need to be careful in how they interpret findings that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization. Second, it is important for policy makers to understand that the impact of dividend tax rate changes on price and cost of capital is greatest for less liquid firms. Our results suggest that these firms enjoy the greatest reductions in cost of capital when the dividend tax rate declines; however, they are also the most disadvantaged from dividend tax rate increases.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present our theoretical analysis and its predictions in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we present our empirical tests of the prediction that results from our theoretical analysis. In Sect. 4, we present results of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
The effect of liquidity on tax rate changes
Our goal is to understand how liquidity affects dividend tax capitalization. Toward that goal, first we describe a market setting where liquidity and investor-level tax rates play salient roles and then derive the price of a firm's shares in this setting. Next we study how liquidity affects the impact of changes in the difference between dividend and capital gains tax rates on expected returns. The results of our analysis suggest that lower liquidity will magnify the impact of such changes, whereas higher liquidity will mitigate the impact. In Sect. 3, using the reduction in the difference between dividend and capital gains tax rates enacted by JGTRRA03, we empirically test our prediction that lower liquidity magnifies the effect of dividend tax capitalization on expected returns.
Share price in an imperfectly competitive market
We consider a one-period economy that consists of one firm, a risk-free asset, and some number of investors. The risk-free asset is a risk-free bond that yields a (pretax) return of $1 þ R f , where R f ! 0 is the (pre-tax) risk-free rate. Let S [ 0 represent the number of shares of stock the firm supplies to the economy. Each share of stock generates uncertain cash flow ofṼ at the end of the period, whereṼ ¼ V represents the (per-share) realization of the cash flow. This implies that the firm generates total (uncertain) cash flow of S ÁṼ. In our analysis, the role of S is not benign because as S increases investors in the economy have to bear increasingly more risk. As we show below, this depresses the price of the firm's shares despite the fact that it has no effect on per-share cash flow (i.e., no effect onṼ). We summarize the notation we employ in Table 1 .
Let P represent the per-share price of the firm's shares at the beginning of the period. We assume there are N ! 3 investors in the economy, each of whom has identical information about the distribution of end of period cash flow.
3 Because investors have homogeneous beliefs, we suppress the specifics of their information and simply assume they believe that the firm's cash flow,Ṽ, has a normal distribution with expected value EṼ Â Ã and variance VarṼ Â Ã . We assume that each investor has a negative exponential (or CARA) utility function for an amount w given by r 1 À exp Àw=r ½ ð Þ , where r is the an investor's constant absolute risk tolerance. We assume that all investors are subject to tax and pay tax at the end of the period. The realization of the firm's end-of-period cash flow,Ṽ ¼ V, is paid out to investors at the end of the period in two ways: (1) as a dividend d; and (2) as a residual, net-of-dividend, cash payment V À d. This implies that investors pay tax on (1) dividends, d, at a dividend tax rate of d; (2) the residual cash payment, V À d, at a capital gains tax rate of t; and (3) the cash proceeds from their investment in the risk-free bond (interest income) at the tax rate of s, where 0 d, t, s\1. In other words, investors' after-tax proceeds on their investments are (1) 1 À d ð Þd on their dividend payout; (2) 1 À t ð ÞṼ À d À P À Á þ P on their residual cash payment (this expression follows from the discussion of capital gains tax in Sikes and Verrecchia (2012) ); and (3) 1 þ 1 À s ð ÞR f on the cash proceeds from their investment in the risk-free bond. To ensure that the analysis is tractable, we make two facilitating assumptions. First, at the appropriate time we set the capital gains tax rate to 0: that is, t ¼ 0. We do not do so immediately, however, but instead defer until we can show that setting t ¼ 0 is without loss of generality. Second, by assuming that all investors are subject to tax we rule out the possibility that only some proportion of investors are subject to tax (as in, e.g., Sansing 2006, 2010; Sikes and Verrecchia 2012) . Assuming that all investors are subject to tax has no qualitative effect on the results we report below. If, instead of assuming that all investors are subject to tax, we assumed that only a proportion were subject to tax with the remainder being tax-exempt, then the fact that the weighted average tax rate of all investors in the economy is lower would mitigate the effect of dividend taxes on expected returns. However, our results concern the marginal effect of changes in liquidity and tax rates on expected returns, and here the proportion plays no role. In other words, increasing the proportion of investors in the economy who are not subject to tax versus increasing the extent to which a stock is illiquid are two separate issues. The former reduces the magnitude of the effect of a tax rate change on share prices, whereas the latter increases the magnitude of the effect of a tax rate change on share prices. Thus, to keep things reasonably simple, we ignore tax heterogeneity among investors in this paper and just focus on the marginal effect of changes in liquidity and in tax rates on expected returns.
Before proceeding with our analysis, we attempt to describe in broad terms the market process that leads to a determination of firm share price, P. As in Kyle (1989) , our analysis characterizes a market process where at the beginning of the period each investor submits a demand function for the firm's shares to a Walrasian auctioneer. The auctioneer aggregates investors' demands and then determines a single price for the shares such that at that price demand for shares equals the supply of those shares. As is standard in any rational expectations setting, each investor's demand for shares maximizes an investor's expected utility as a function of the price that clears the market. In this sense, our market-clearing process is identical to 4 What distinguishes our market-clearing process from the rational expectations literature based on perfect competition, however, is that we assume that each investor's demand function incorporates a belief as to how his demand affects prices and this belief is self-sustaining in equilibrium.
To characterize the market-clearing process in greater detail, we start by letting D i represent investor i's demand for shares of the firm, B i represent investor i's demand for the risk-free bond, and Funds i represent investor i's funds available to invest in shares of the firm and the risk-free bond. The after-tax proceeds to investor i for holding D i shares of the firm is
Thus, in determining her demand for shares in the firm, D i , and for the risk-free bond, B i , each investor solves the following objective function
subject to the budget constraint
Substituting B i ¼ Funds i À D i P allows us to re-express the objective function as
simplifying this expression yields
Taking the expectation of Eq. (1) using standard techniques for evaluating the moment generating function yields
In contrast to a model of perfect competition, a model of imperfect competition posits that investors take into consideration the effect of their demand on price. Specifically, and following Kyle (1989) and Lambert et al. (2012) , we characterize imperfect competition as the self-sustaining belief by each investor that he faces an upwardly sloping price curve for firm shares. In particular, we assume each investor believes that his demand is related to price as follows:
where p 0 is the intercept in the determination of P that is unrelated to an investor's demand and k is the coefficient applied to an investor's demand. We interpret k as the degree of illiquidity associated with an individual investor's demand. When k is small, an investor's demand moves price less, and thus the market for firm shares is more liquid with respect to demand; when k is large, an investor's demand moves price more, and thus the market is less liquid for firm shares. Each investor treats k as fixed when he determines the demand that maximizes his expected utility; our goal below is to determine a self-sustaining k.
Returning to an investor's optimization problem, an investor solves for D i based on his belief that his demand affects firm share price through the relation P ¼ p 0 þ kD i . Based on this belief, an investor solves for D i in Eq. (2) by substituting into this equation the relation P ¼ p 0 þ kD i , taking the derivative of the expression that results with respect to D i , and then setting the result equal to 0. In other words, an investor takes the derivative of
with respect to D i and sets the result equal to 0: this yields the first-order condition
Substituting P for the relation p 0 þ kD i back into Eq. (3) and solving for the investor's optimal demand yields
Market clearing requires that investors' demand for firm shares equals the supply of those shares. That is, P must satisfy
where here we characterize an investor's demand, D i Á ð Þ , as a function of the price of the firm's shares, P. Substituting for D i P ð Þ from Eq. (4) and simplifying yields the following result:
We codify our analysis to this point in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In an imperfectly competitive economy where N identically informed investors compete to hold shares in a firm, the price of the firm's shares is
Proposition 1 implies that the firm's share price can be expressed as three components. The first component,
, is the firm's expected after-tax cash flow. The second component,
N , is the discount in price that manifests in a setting where competition among risk-averse investors to hold firm shares is perfect. The third component, k S N , is an additional discount in the expression for price that measures the extent to which the market is illiquid (i.e., the extent to which the market is not perfectly competitive). As we allude to above, both discounts increase as S increases because investors in the economy have to bear increasingly more risk.
To expand on this issue briefly, consider the possibility that the economy is perfectly competitive. Perfect competition is tantamount to assuming k ¼ 0, and here the price of the firm's shares in Eq. (5) reduces to
Alternatively, if competition is imperfect, then this is tantamount to assuming k [ 0; and thus price absorbs the additional discount k S N : see, for example, the discussion in Lambert et al. (2012) .
Solving for k
The next step in the analysis is to solve for k. Although the solution follows directly from Kyle (1989) (see also Lambert et al. 2012) and thus is straightforward, nonetheless it is complicated in detail. Thus we relegate the solution to the appendix and here simply state the result: solving for k yields
Combining the expressions for k in Eq. (6) and P in Proposition 1 yields the following result.
Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity
Proposition 2 In an imperfectly competitive economy where N identically informed investors compete to hold shares in a firm, one can show that
and thus the price of shares in the firm reduces to
Note that the expression for price in Proposition 2 is unique and well-defined, provided that N ! 3. Combining the expressions for D i in Eq. (4), k in Eq. (6), and P in Proposition 2, one can show that in equilibrium each investor holds D i ¼ S N shares in the firm. This result is intuitive: in equilibrium, each of N identical investors holds 1=N
Àth of the total number of the firm's shares, S. This implies that each investor bears the risk associated with uncertain cash flow of S N ÁṼ and in aggregate investors bear the risk of the firm's total cash flow of S ÁṼ.
In the expression for P in Proposition 2, note that the effect of a dividend on firm share price is to reduce the firm's (per-share) expected cash flow net of capital gains tax, 1 À t ð ÞEṼ Â Ã , by the dividend multiplied by the difference between the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate, d À t ð Þd. In other words, (per-share) after-tax cash flow adjusts for the fact that dividends and capital gains are taxed at different rates. We represent the difference in tax rates as T: that is, T ¼ d À t. The focus of our attention is on the impact of an increase in the difference between the dividend tax rate d and the capital gains tax rate t on the firm's expected rate of return: in other words, the impact of an increase in T. For example, T can increase if (1) the dividend tax rate d increases holding the capital gains tax rate t fixed, (2) the capital gains tax rate t falls holding the dividend tax rate d fixed, or (3) the dividend tax rate d simultaneously increases while the capital gains tax rate t falls. Because the focus of our attention is on T and not on d or t per se, henceforth we assume without loss of generality that the capital gains tax rate t is 0: that is, t ¼ 0. Note that, by ''without loss of generality,'' we mean that all of our results, and in particular Proposition 3 below, hold for t [ 0: the role of setting t ¼ 0 is simply to ease the burden of expressing firm share price and expected returns in terms of t. The following expression for firm share price results from setting t ¼ 0.
Corollary to Proposition 2 Setting the capital gains tax rate t to 0 (i.e., t ¼ 0) in Proposition 2 yields
and thus the price of shares in the firm becomes
Our next step is to use the results of this section to study expected returns.
Comparative statics
Using the expression for the price of the firm's shares in the corollary to Proposition 2, the firm's expected return is
Note that tax rates affect the firm's expected return in two ways: (1) through the difference between the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate, T; and (2) through the tax rate on the risk-free bond (interest income) of s. Our goal is to understand how liquidity affects the impact of a change in T on the firm's expected return. Toward achieving that goal, first we have to address three issues. The first issue is that k in our analysis, which is sometimes referred to as ''Kyle's k'' in reference to Kyle (1985 Kyle ( , 1989 , is a measure of illiquidity. Consequently, we re-state our goal as one of determining the marginal effect of a change in illiquidity on the marginal effect of a change in the tax rate on the firm's expected return. This goal can be expressed mathematically as one of determining the sign of the crosspartial derivative o ok o oT
The second issue is that in our analysis k is an endogenous variable, and so properly we should not be using it to take a derivative. A technique for addressing this issue is to reverse the roles of k and N. Specifically, N is ostensibly an exogenous parameter, but by appealing to Eq. (6) and setting t ¼ 0, we can define N in terms of k, as opposed to defining k in terms of N: in other words, Eq. (6) implies
This technique treats N as an endogenous variable and k as an exogenous parameter. In turn, this allows us to re-express the price of the firm's shares in the corollary to Proposition 2 in terms of k as
and then re-express the firm's expected rate of return in Eq. (7) in terms of k as Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity To digress briefly, note that, if we require that N ! 3 for the expression for price in Proposition 2 to be unique and well defined, then in Eq. (8) it must be the case
Thus one feature to the approach of treating k as an exogenous parameter is that it restricts k to levels of illiquidity that are not ''excessively large,'' where the latter is defined by the right-hand-side of Eq. (11). That said, this restriction is simply the reciprocal of the requirement that at least three investors compete to hold firm shares (i.e., N ! 3), which, arguably, is not an especially burdensome real-world institutional assumption. The third issue is that we would like to eliminate from consideration potentially perverse cases that arise from the possibility that the price of the firm's shares is negative. We interpret a negative share price as a circumstance where investors have to be subsidized to hold a firm's shares-once again, an unlikely outcome in realworld institutional settings. A necessary condition that share price be nonnegative is that end-of-period expected cash flow is nonnegative: that is, EṼ Â Ã ! 0. Even in the presence of nonnegative expected cash flow, however, share price can be negative if, for example, (1) the firm's expected cash flow is too low in relation to the variance of its cash flow (i.e., EṼ Â Ã is low and VarṼ Â Ã high); (2) investors' tolerance for risk is too low (i.e., r is low); (3) the supply of the firm's shares is too high (i.e., S is high); or (4) a combination of these three. Recall that we assume that S [ 0. Thus an inequality that restricts the supply of the firm's shares in relation to other (exogenous) parameters so as to ensure that share price is nonnegative is
Henceforth we assume this to be the case.
Having addressed these three issues, next we calculate o ok o oT EṼ ÀP P h i under the assumption firm share price is nonnegative: that is, Eq. (12) holds. The calculation is tedious, and so here we simply report the result: the marginal effect of an increase in illiquidity on the marginal effect of an increase in the difference between the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate on expected returns is positive. We state this formally as our third proposition and provide a proof in the appendix.
Proposition 3
In an imperfectly competitive economy where N identically informed (and endogenously determined) investors compete to hold shares in a firm and the resulting price of those shares is nonnegative, the marginal effect of an increase in illiquidity, k, on the marginal effect of an increase in the difference between the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate, T, on expected rates of return is positive.
The economic intuition for Proposition 3 is that, as the market for a firm's shares becomes less liquid, share price becomes more sensitive to changes in features of the economy. Share price is more sensitive in a less liquid market because less liquidity implies that there is less cushion to absorb shocks to, or changes in, the economy. Consequently, lower liquidity will magnify the effect of tax rate changes, whereas higher liquidity will mitigate the effect of tax rate changes. This implies that, in assessing the behavior of expected returns, the effect of a change in a tax rate cannot be divorced from the level of liquidity in trade in a firm's shares.
Reconciliation with prior dividend tax capitalization models
We express Eq. (7) in terms of exogenous parameters. On the left-hand side of the equation, we express the expected rate of return as the expected return, EṼ À P Â Ã , divided by price, P; however, on the right-hand side of the equation, we do not divide a firm's per-share dividend payment (d) by its price. In contrast, prior theoretical dividend tax capitalization papers (e.g., Brennan 1970; Guenther and Sansing 2010) divide both the expected return and the dividend payment by price. In other words, prior studies that examine the effect of the difference between how dividends and stock appreciation are taxed on expected rates of return in an equilibrium framework express the dividend tax capitalization effect in terms of dividend yield. To aid readers in reconciling our model with the models used in prior studies that make dividend yield explicit, we can use the endogenous values of P and k and omit the exogenous term EṼ Â Ã . When we do so, we can re-express Eq. (7) as follows:
The revised expression shows that the expected rate of return reflects four components: the after-tax risk-free rate, a risk premium, an illiquidity premium, and the dividend tax penalty. At first glance, one might question how illiquidity and T interact to affect expected rates of return. As we explain in the introduction, illiquidity magnifies the effect of a change in T on expected rates of return because as the market for a firm's shares becomes less liquid, heightened price sensitivity associated with lower liquidity implies that the absolute value of the percentage change in price following a change in T increases. A reduction in the dividend tax rate leads to an increasingly larger percentage increase in price as illiquidity increases and thus a smaller dividend yield, assuming the per-share dividend payment Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity (d) is held constant. As a result, in response to a decrease in T , holding constant d, the dividend tax penalty ðTd=PÞ will decline more for less liquid stocks.
Empirical tests
In this section, we empirically test our prediction that lower liquidity magnifies and higher liquidity mitigates the positive relation between expected returns and the difference between the statutory dividend tax rate and the statutory capital gains tax rate (T). JGTRRA03 was enacted in May 2003, and it reduced the maximum statutory tax rate on dividends from 38.1 to 15 % and the maximum statutory tax rate on capital gains from 20 to 15 %. Thus the difference between the maximum statutory dividend and capital gains tax rates fell from 18.6 % to zero. Because a taxable investor faces an effective capital gains tax rate that is less than the statutory rate due to deferral of taxation until sale, tax-free step-up in basis at death, and the nonrecognition of capital gains when appreciated property is donated to charity, the difference between the two effective rates was likely greater than 18.6 % prior to JGTRRA03 and greater than zero after JGTRRA03. Although the exact amount by which the difference between the dividend tax rate and effective capital gains tax rate fell following JGTRRA03 is unclear, it is indisputable that the difference declined significantly. Our sample includes firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004. 5 We use a narrow window around the enactment of JGTRRA03 so that few things other than the difference between the two tax rates change over the sample period. Importantly, our measure of illiquidity, which we discuss below, does not vary significantly over the sample period. 6 Our primary proxy for expected returns is the implied cost of capital measure developed by Easton et al. (2002) . Easton et al. (2002) develop a method for simultaneously estimating the cost of equity capital and the growth in residual earnings that are implied by current stock prices, current book value of equity, and short-term forecasts of accounting earnings. Prior studies of the effect of dividend taxes on expected returns use implied cost of capital measures that assume a growth rate in residual earnings. Because we expect that growth in residual earnings varied among firms over this period, we believe that the Easton et al. (2002) measure is more appropriate. In Sect. 4.2, we also present results using the average of the implied cost of capital measures commonly used in prior studies.
We begin by estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the expected rate of return and growth in residual earnings over our sample period:
The dependent variable ðE i;yþ1 =B i;y Þ equals the I/B/E/S median consensus forecast of earnings per share for year y?1 measured just after the announcement of earnings for fiscal year y, scaled by the book value of equity per share at the end of year y. Consistent with Easton and Sommers (2007) , we choose the first consensus forecast announced at least 14 days after the date of the earnings announcement. The independent variable ðP i;y =B i;y Þ equals the price at the close of trade 1 day after the announcement of year y earnings scaled by book value per share at the end of year y. Consistent with Easton et al. (2002) and Easton and Sommers (2007) , we only include calendar year-end firms so that the implied discount rate and growth rate are estimated at the same point in time for each firm-year observation. Also consistent with Easton et al. (2002) , we drop any observation for which either the price-tobook ratio or the aggregate forecasted earnings-to-book value ratio is in the top or bottom 1 % of observations. In the above model, c 0 is the estimate of the growth rate in residual earnings, and (c 0 þ c 1 Þ is the expected return estimate.
The residual income valuation model underlying Eq. (13) describes the value of a stock at its fiscal year-end. Our analysis above is based on a price after this date. To accommodate this difference, we replace P i;y in Eq. (13) with price discounted by the expected rate of return ðb rÞ back to the fiscal year-end, that is,
where s is the number of days between the fiscal year-end and the price date. Since the discounting of price requires the expected return that we are attempting to estimate in Eq. (13), we use an iterative method following Easton et al. (2002) and Easton and Sommers (2007) . We begin these iterations by assuming a discount rate for prices of 12 %. We next estimate Eq. (13) and obtain estimates of the expected return, which we then use as the new rate for discounting prices. We then reestimate Eq. (13) and provide another estimate of the expected return. This procedure is repeated until the estimate of the expected return and the rate used in discounting price converge.
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Included in Eq. (13) are indicator variables for each of Fama and French's 30 industry portfolios (Fama and French 1997) and the following control variables (defined below as well as in Table 2 ): AMIHUD, YIELD, INST, SIZE, BM, ROE, LEV , BETA_MKTRF, BETA_SMB, BETA_HML, BETA_UMD, and FBIAS. As suggested in section 12.6 of Easton (2007), we demean each control variable and include the demeaned control variable as well as the demeaned control variable interacted with P i;y =B i;y : Note that, because we include control variables and industry indicator variables in the model, the estimates that we derive for the expected return (r) and the growth rate in residual earnings (g) for all tests that use the Easton et al. (2002) model are only incremental r and g after controlling for these other effects. We cluster standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009 ). 8 7 Over our sample period, the annual estimates converge after five iterations. 8 We cluster all standard errors in the paper by firm. We do not control for cross-sectional dependence by also clustering the standard errors by year because there are too few year clusters, and Petersen (2009) explains that too few clusters biases the standard errors. When we double cluster the standard errors by firm and year in untabulated tests, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 5, 6 , 7 and 8. Our proxy for lower levels of liquidity is Amihud's (2002) measure of price impact. It equals the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day, averaged over the trading days in year y -1 for which there is return and volume data, or (2002), we apply several restrictions when calculating the ratio. First, we require for there to be stock return and volume data for more than 200 days of year y -1 for firm i to calculate its ratio. Second, we require for the stock price to be greater than $5 at the end of year y -1. Third, data to calculate firm i's market capitalization must be available at the end of year y -1. Fourth, after applying the restrictions above, we winsorize observations for the measure at the 1st and 99th percentiles for each year. The variable INST equals the percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors. We control for dividend yield, YIELD, which equals the amount of dividends that firm i paid to common shareholders in year y -1 scaled by firm i's market capitalization, both collected from Compustat (Ayers et al. 2002) . We set the variable equal to zero for nondividend-paying firms. Although dividend yield is associated with the amount of dividend taxes that investors currently have to pay and thus may be expected to be positively associated with expected returns, studies show that it also reduces agency costs and information asymmetry, which in turn reduces expected returns (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985; John and Williams 1985; Jensen 1986) .
Consistent with prior literature, we control for the impact of information asymmetry on a firm's expected return. We include several controls that prior studies find are potentially associated with information asymmetry. These include firm size measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE), bookto-market ratio (BM), and leverage measured as the sum of current and long-term liabilities scaled by total assets (LEV). One might expect for information asymmetry to be lower among larger firms and higher among firms with higher book-to-market ratios and higher leverage (Sadka and Scherbina 2007) . We control for profitability with the ratio of net income before extraordinary items divided by book value of equity (ROE).
We control for risk by including the coefficient estimates from estimating a fourfactor Fama-French-Carhart model (Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997 ) using return data from the 48 months prior to year y -1 (BETA_MKTRF, BETA_SMB, BETA_HML, and BETA_UMD). We control for forecast bias by including a control variable that equals 1-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual values), Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity scaled by lagged total assets per share (FBIAS). If forecasts are overly optimistic and market participants understand this bias and adjust prices accordingly, estimates generated from implied cost of capital models will be upwardly biased. We winsorize all continuous independent variables used in our analysis at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Next we examine whether the finding in Dhaliwal et al. (2007) that firms' expected returns fell following JGTRRA03 is robust to using the Easton et al. (2002) measure. We estimate the following OLS regression: All other variables are previously defined. In the above regression, c 2 is the estimate of the effect of JGTRRA03 on growth in residual earnings, and ðc 2 þ c 3 Þ is the estimate of the effect on expected returns.
To test our primary prediction that low liquidity magnifies the positive relation between expected returns and the difference between the dividend and capital gain tax rates, we estimate the following OLS regression:
The variable HIGHAMIHUD equals one if the value of AMIHUD exceeds the yearly sample median and zero otherwise. All other variables are previously defined. We exclude AMIHUD and its interaction with P i;y =B i;y in the estimation of Eq. (15) since it includes HIGHAMIHUD. The effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns of high liquidity stocks is captured by ðc 2 þ c 3 Þ, and its effect on expected returns of low liquidity stocks is captured by ðc 2 þ c 3 þ c 6 þ c 7 Þ: Thus the difference in the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns of low vs. high liquidity stocks is captured by ðc 6 þ c 7 Þ. Our sample includes firms that are listed on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stocks Exchange (AMEX), or NASDAQ; are in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat Merged Database; have data on quarterly institutional holdings reported on Form 13F available in the ThomsonReuters database; and have analyst forecast data on the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). There are 5,471 firm-year observations in our sample. Columns (1)- (3) of Table 5 present the results of estimating Eqs. (13)- (15), respectively. We suppress control variables, as well as their interactions with P i;y =B i;y , and industry indicator variables in Table 5 for brevity. Column (1) shows that the estimated growth in residual earnings over the sample period is 12.6 % and the implied cost of capital is 14.26 %, both significantly different from zero at the 1 % level. As we explain above, these are just the incremental growth rate in residual earnings and implied cost of capital after controlling for firm-specific variables and industry effects.
10 Consistent with the findings in Dhaliwal et al. (2007) , column (2) shows that expected returns declined significantly following JGTRRA03. We estimate a decrease of 1.52 % points, which is significant at the 5 % level.
11 In column (3), we examine the difference in the impact of JGTRRA03 on expected returns between high and low liquidity stocks. We find that the decrease in expected returns is only significant among less liquid stocks. Expected returns of stocks whose value of Amihud's illiquidity measure is above the yearly sample median decline 2.83 % points, whereas the decline for stocks whose value of illiquidity is below the yearly sample median is only 0.26 % points. The difference between the two is 2.57 % points and is statistically significant at the 5 % level.
12
In column (4), we replace the HIGHAMIHUD indicator variable in Eq. (15) with an indicator variable HIGHINST that equals one if the value of institutional ownership exceeds the yearly sample median and zero otherwise. Unlike prior studies that use implied cost of capital measures that rely on an assumed growth rate in residual earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 2007; Dai et al. 2013 ), we do not find a significant difference in the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns between stocks with high vs. low institutional investor ownership. The decline in expected returns following JGTRRA03 is statistically insignificant for stocks with either high or low institutional ownership.
In summary, using a model that simultaneously estimates expected returns and the growth rate in residual earnings, consistent with our prediction, we find that illiquidity magnifies the positive relation between expected returns and the difference between dividend and capital gain tax rates. Unlike prior studies that use implied cost of capital estimates that rely on an assumed growth rate in residual earnings, we do not find that institutional ownership mitigates the positive relation. 10 In untabulated tests, we also estimate Eq. (13) without control variables and industry indicator variables and find that the model generates an estimated growth rate in residual earnings of 5.56 % and an estimated implied cost of capital of 7.25 % over the sample period. 11 The estimated 1.52 % point decrease is similar to the estimated 1.47 % point decrease from the end of March 2003 to the end of June 2003 documented by Dhaliwal et al. (2007) . 12 In untabulated tests, we create an indicator variable HIGHYIELD that equals one if a firm's annual dividend yield exceeds the sample median and zero otherwise, and we interact it with P i;y =B i;y and POSTJGTRRA03. We find that expected returns declined significantly for low-and high-yield stocks with no significant difference between the two, and our results related to illiquidity continue to hold.
Thus in later tests, discussed in Sect. 4.2, we repeat the analysis using these other implied cost of capital measures to (1) ensure that we can replicate prior studies' result related to institutional ownership once we use the same implied cost of capital measures that they use and (2) examine whether institutional investors' mitigating effect is attributable to greater liquidity as opposed to the marginal investor being insensitive to dividend taxes.
Robustness tests 4.1 Risk
In this section, we examine whether other variables that affect price in the same manner as does illiquidity (e.g., risk) also magnify the relation between expected returns and the difference between dividend and capital gain tax rates. In addition, we examine whether taxable investors' risk tolerance magnifies the relation. Theory holds that the extent to which dividend taxes are capitalized depends on the weighted average tax rate of all investors in an economy, where the weights depend on investors' risk tolerances. Thus the effect of a change in the difference between dividend and capital gain tax rates on expected returns will be magnified the greater 
(8)
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Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal for variables in Eqs. (13) Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity taxable investors' risk tolerance (Guenther and Sansing 2010) . Both of these explanations, like the one for illiquidity, have a theoretical foundation. We empirically test the magnifying effects of risk and taxable investors' risk tolerance and present the results in Table 6 . We re-estimate Eq. (15) but replace HIGHAMIHUD with indicator variables that divide the sample according to high vs. low levels of common risk factors or according to high vs. low relative risk tolerance of taxable investors (RRTTI) as measured in Guenther and Sansing (2010) . 13 Columns (1)- (4) of Table 6 present the results using HIGHMKTRFBETA, HIGHSIZE, HIGHBM, and HIGHRRTTI, respectively. HIGHMKTBETA equals one if the value of BETA_MKTRF is above the yearly sample median and zero otherwise. HIGHSIZE, HIGHBM, and HIGHRRTTI are defined analogously. Both risk and taxable investors' risk tolerance should magnify the effect of JGTRRA03 on firms' expected returns. In other words, expected returns should decline more following JGTRRA03 for stocks for which HIGHMKTRFBETA, HIGHBM, or Guenther and Sansing (2010) regress the percentage of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors on a market model beta, log of market value of equity, book-to-market, standard deviation of daily stock returns, and the difference between dividend yield and the risk-free rate. They then construct an estimate of the RRTTI by computing a predicted value of institutional ownership using the coefficients on beta, size, book-to-market, and volatility and then subtracting the predicted value from one.
Table 6
Effect of risk and taxable investors' risk tolerance on dividend tax capitalization Dividend tax capitalization and liquidity Table 6 continued Table 6 continued HIGHRRTTI equals one and for stocks for which HIGHSIZE equals zero.
14 Although we find that high BM and high RRTTI stocks experience significant declines in expected returns, whereas the decline is insignificant for low BM and low RRTTI stocks, the differences between the high and low BM and RRTTI stocks are insignificant. Only firm size appears to moderate the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns. Expected returns decline 2.63 % points for small stocks but only 0.24 % points for large stocks, a difference of 2.39 % points that is significant at the 5 % level. The mitigating effect of firm size on dividend tax capitalization is likely at least partially attributable to the greater liquidity of larger stocks. This interpretation is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Amihud 2002 ) that holds that the ''size effect'' (i.e., higher risk-adjusted returns of smaller firms) first documented by Banz (1981) could actually be attributable to the lower liquidity of small stocks. In other words, size is a proxy for liquidity. 
Alternate proxy for expected rate of return
Because we cannot replicate prior studies' result that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization using the Easton et al. (2002) measure of implied cost of capital, in this section, we use the implied cost of capital measures that are used in these prior studies. Dhaliwal et al. (2005 Dhaliwal et al. ( , 2007 and Dai et al. (2013) use implied cost of capital measures based on the models in Claus and Thomas (2001) , Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) , as implemented in Gode and Mahanram (2003) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) . 16 As previously explained, unlike the Easton et al. (2002) model, these models do not simultaneously estimate the growth rate of residual earnings and the implied cost of capital; rather, they use an assumed growth rate in residual earnings. In the tests below, following Dhaliwal et al. (2007) and Dai et al. (2013) , we use the average of these three measures (r_ave). 17 We estimate the following OLS regression to test our prediction that the positive relation between expected returns and the difference between dividend and capital 14 French (1992, 1993) find that expected returns for smaller stocks and stocks with higher book-to-market ratios are greater because of the additional risk inherent in these stocks. 15 In an untabulated test, we replace BETA_MKTRF with a beta estimated using a CAPM market model, and we drop BETA_SMB, BETA_HML, and BETA_UMD from the estimation of the regression in column (1) of Table 6 . The results do not change (i.e., the market model beta also does not moderate the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns). 16 The basic idea of all three models is to substitute price and analyst forecasts into a valuation equation and to back out the cost of capital as the internal rate of return that equates current stock price with the expected future sequence of residual incomes or abnormal earnings. The individual models differ with respect to the use of analyst forecast data, the assumptions regarding short-term and long-term growth, the explicit forecasting horizon, and whether and how inflation is incorporated into the steady-state terminal value. 17 Unlike Dhaliwal et al. (2007) , we use annual as opposed to quarterly estimates to avoid the error in quarterly forecasts (which tends to average out if aggregated over a year) and because of the seasonality in quarterly data. We thank Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz for sharing these annual measures of cost of capital with us and refer readers to the appendices of Leuz (2006, 2009) for a detailed explanation of the calculation of each measure. gain tax rates is stronger among less liquid stocks using the alternative measure of expected returns: Column (1) of Table 7 presents the results of estimating Eq. (16). Consistent with the results in column (3) of Table 5 , in column (1) we find that the decrease in expected returns following JGTRRA03 is significantly greater for less liquid firms.
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In column (2), we re-estimate Eq. (16), but instead of interacting POSTJGTRRA03 with AMIHUD, we interact it with INST. The coefficient on the interaction is positive and significant, consistent with the finding in prior studies that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization. In column (3), we include both interactions. The interaction POSTJGTRRRA03*AMIHUD remains negative and significant at the 1 % level, consistent with our prediction; however, the interaction POSTJGTRRA03*INST is no longer significant. We conclude from this result that institutional ownership's mitigating effect on dividend tax capitalization documented in prior studies is attributable to greater liquidity of stocks with greater institutional 18 These statistics are similar to the mean and median r avg in Dhaliwal et al. (2007) . Panel A of their Table 2 shows that the mean (median) r avg equals 9.59 % (9.08 %). The mean and median are also similar to the implied cost of capital generated from the estimation of our Eq. (13) without control variables and industry indicator variables (7.25 %). 19 To aid in the interpretation of the coefficients, we demean the value of AMIHUD used in the interaction term as well as all other continuous variables used in interaction terms below (Burks et al. 2013) . 20 In an untabulated test, we add an interaction of POSTJGTRRA03 with YIELD. Consistent with prior dividend tax capitalization studies, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and significant, and we continue to find that expected returns declined significantly more for less than for more liquid stocks. ownership rather than to the marginal investor being insensitive to dividend taxes. To further investigate whether this is the case, we next estimate a predicted value of AMIHUD (AMIHUD_PRED) by regressing AMIHUD on INST. In column (4), we include AMIHUD_PRED as well as its interaction with POSTJGTRRA03. The coefficient on the interaction is negative and significant at the 5 % level. This result suggests that the portion of liquidity attributable to institutional ownership mitigates the decrease in expected returns following JGTRRA03.
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Similar to the analysis in Table 6 using the Easton et al. (2002) implied cost of capital measure, in Panel A of Table 8 , we next examine whether risk and taxable investors' relative risk tolerance magnify the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns. In columns (1)-(4), we re-estimate Eq. (16), but instead of interacting POSTJGTRRA03 with AMIHUD, we interact it with BETA_MKTRF, SIZE, BM, and RRTTI, respectively. The positive and significant coefficient on the interaction with SIZE and the negative and significant coefficients on the interactions with BM and RRTTI are consistent with risk and taxable investors' risk tolerances magnifying the effect of JGTRRA03 on expected returns.
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With the exception of the Pearson correlation between INST and BM, Table 4 shows that INST is significantly correlated with BETA_MKTRF, SIZE, BM, and RRTTI, although the magnitudes of these correlations are smaller than the magnitude of the negative correlation between AMIHUD and INST. Similar to the analysis in column (3) of Table 7 , we next examine whether institutional ownership's mitigating effect on dividend tax capitalization is attributable to lower risk or lower relative risk tolerances of taxable investors (as opposed to the marginal investor being insensitive to dividend taxes). Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. In column (1), the coefficient on the interaction of POSTJGTRRA03 with INST remains positive and significant and the interaction of POSTJGTRRA03 with Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are included in the estimation but suppressed in the table. Robust standard errors clustered by firm appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates ***, **, * denote statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test 21 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to use the predicted value of AMIHUD. 22 We do not include the main effect of RRTTI in the estimation in column (4) of Panels A and B of Table  8 because some of its determinants are already included in the estimation. However, in untabulated tests, we find that the results are quantitatively similar when we include RRTTI in the estimation. (2)- (4) respectively, the interaction of POSTJGTRRA03 with INST is no longer significant; however, the former interactions all remain significant.
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In summary, when we use the implied cost of capital measures used in prior studies that attribute institutional ownership's mitigating effect on dividend tax capitalization to the marginal investor being insensitive to dividend taxes, we too find that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization. However, further analysis suggests that institutional ownership's mitigating role is attributable to the greater liquidity, lower risk, and lower relative risk tolerance of taxable investors of stocks with greater institutional ownership, as opposed to the marginal investor being insensitive to dividend taxes. Unlike the marginal investor argument, all three of the former explanations are grounded in theory.
Conclusion
This paper offers a new theory related to cross-sectional variation in dividend tax capitalization. Unlike prior theory studies on dividend tax capitalization that rely on the after-tax CAPM, our analysis features an imperfectly competitive market in which liquidity plays a role in determining the effect of investor-level tax rates on firms' expected rates of return. The prediction generated from our analysis is that lower liquidity magnifies the effect of a change in the difference between dividend Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are included in the estimation but suppressed in the table. Robust standard errors clustered by firm appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates ***, **, * denote statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test 23 Similar to the analysis in column (4) of Table 7 using AMIHUD_PRED, we also calculate predicted values of SIZE and BM by regressing each of them on INST. In untabulated tests, we replace SIZE and BM in columns (2) and (3), respectively, of Panel A of Table 8 with their predicted values. The coefficients on the interactions of the predicted values of SIZE and BM with POSTJGTRRA03 are significantly positive and negative, respectively; however, the statistical significance for the predicted size interaction falls to the 10 % level.
and capital gain tax rates on expected returns, whereas higher liquidity mitigates the effect. We empirically test our prediction using the reduction in the difference between the dividend and capital gain tax rates enacted by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the decrease in expected returns following the act is significantly greater for less liquid stocks. Our results should be of interest to policymakers because they suggest that the impact of dividend tax rate changes on price and cost of capital is greatest for less liquid firms. This paper also provides an important implication for prior studies: prior studies that attribute the attenuating force of institutional ownership on dividend tax capitalization to institutional investors being either tax-exempt or tax-insensitive with respect to dividends suffer from an omitted variable: liquidity. We show that institutional ownership is highly correlated with liquidity and that the mitigating role of institutional ownership no longer exists once we control for the effect of liquidity on dividend tax capitalization. Similarly, additional analysis shows that institutional ownership is also capturing lower risk and lower relative risk tolerances of taxable investors (Guenther and Sansing 2010) , both of which mitigate dividend tax capitalization.
where once again D i P ð Þ represents an investor's demand as a function of P. Substituting D i ¼ a À bP into this equation and solving for the P that clears the market yields
where D is given by
Here, D represents the marginal impact on price of an additional share brought to (or withdrawn from) the market by the firm. To ensure the market clearing condition P ¼ D Na À S ð Þin conjunction with the conjecture that D i ¼ a À bP, p 0 and k in the expression P ¼ p 0 þ kD i must be of the form
respectively. The rationale for this claim is that when this is the case
which implies P 1 þ kb ð Þ¼k Na À S ð Þand thus
solving for k in Eq. (17) yields k ¼ 1 NÀ1 b À1 . We further solve for k by substituting in for b in the identity
This yields the result:
Proof of Proposition 3 To start, we restate the expression for the firm's expected rate of return in Eq. (10)
Taking the derivative of the firm's expected rate of return with respect to T yields o oT
where P is defined as in Eq. (9):
It should be clear from the expression in Eq. (18) that 
